13（）

A.manifesting
B.accounting
C.recording
D.photocopying

In 1959 the (41) American family paid $ 989 (42) a year’ s supply of food. In 1972 the family paid $1 311. That was a price (43) of nearly one-third.

Every family has (44) this sort of experience. Everyone agrees that the cost of (45) a family has risen sharply. But there is less agreement (46) reasons for the rise are being discussed. Who is really (47)

Many blame the farmers who (48) the vegetables, fruit, meat, eggs and cheese (49) stores offer for (50) . According to the U.S. Department of (51) , the farmer’s share of the $ 1 311 spent by the family in 1972 was $ 521. This was thirty-one percent (52) than the farmer had received in 1959.

But farmers claim that this increase was very small (53) to the increase in their cost of (54) . Farmers tend to blame others for the sharp (55) in food prices. They particularly blame those who (56) the farm products after the products leave the farm. These (57) truck drives, meat packers, manufacturers of packages and other food containers, and the (58) of stores where food is sold. They are among the "middlemen" who stand (59) the farmer and the people who buy and eat the food. (60) middlemen the ones to blame for food price

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In 1959 the (41) American family paid $ 989 (42) a year’ s supply of food. In 1972 the family paid $1 311. That was a price (43) of nearly one-third.

Every family has (44) this sort of experience. Everyone agrees that the cost of (45) a family has risen sharply. But there is less agreement (46) reasons for the rise are being discussed. Who is really (47)

Many blame the farmers who (48) the vegetables, fruit, meat, eggs and cheese (49) stores offer for (50) . According to the U.S. Department of (51) , the farmer’s share of the $ 1 311 spent by the family in 1972 was $ 521. This was thirty-one percent (52) than the farmer had received in 1959.

But farmers claim that this increase was very small (53) to the increase in their cost of (54) . Farmers tend to blame others for the sharp (55) in food prices. They particularly blame those who (56) the farm products after the products leave the farm. These (57) truck drives, meat packers, manufacturers of packages and other food containers, and the (58) of stores where food is sold. They are among the "middlemen" who stand (59) the farmer and the people who buy and eat the food. (60) middlemen the ones to blame for food price

急性粒细胞白血病

急性早幼粒细胞白血病

急性单核细胞白血病

红白血病

急性淋巴细胞白血病

Some of the concerns surrounding Turkey’s application to join the European Union, to be (1) on by the EU’s Council of Ministers on December 17th, are economic--in particular, the country’s relative poverty. Its GDP per head is less than a third of the average for the 15 pre-2004 members of the EU. (2) it is not far off that of Latvia--one of the ten new members which (3) on May 1st 2004, and it is much the same as (4) of two countries, Bulgaria and Romania, which this week concluded (5) talks with the EU that could make them full members on January 1st 2007.

(6) , the country’s recent economic progress has been, according to Donald Johnston, the secretary-general of the OECD, stunning. GDP in the second quarter of the year was 13.4% higher than a year earlier, a (7) of growth that no EU country comes close to (8) . Turkey’s (9) rate has just fallen into single figures for the first time since 1972, and this week the country (10) agreement with the IMF on a new three-year, $10 billion economic program that will help Turkey (11) inflation toward European levels, and enhance the economy’s resilience.

Resilience has not historically been the country’s economic strong point. (12) , throughout the 1990s growth oscillated like an electrocardiogram (13) a violent heart attack. This (14) has been one of the main reasons why the country has failed dismally to attract much-needed foreign direct investment. Its stock of such investment is lower now than it was in the 1980s, and annual (15) have scarcely ever reached $1 billion.

One deterrent to foreign investors is due to (16) on January 1st 2005. On that day, Turkey will take away the right of virtually every one of its citizens to call themselves a millionaire. Six zeros will be removed from the face value of the lira (里拉，土耳其货币单位); one unit of the local (17) will henceforth be worth what 1 million are now--ie, about ￡ 0.53 (0.53 欧元). Goods will have to be (18) in both the new and old lira for the whole of the year, (19) foreign bankers and (20) can begin to look forward to a time in Turkey when they will no longer have to juggle mentally with indeterminate strings of zeros.

Mourning the death of one of its own is perhaps the entertainment industry’s most time-honored traditions. After an agonizing and prolonged decline, the long-suffering Vertically Integrated Media Conglomerate passed away.

It’s an idea that was born when Time Inc. merged with Warner Communications Corp. in 1989, to form Time Warner. It endured as the industry’s prevailing business model for nearly a generation, spawning such clones and mongrel breeds as Viacom, News Corp and GE’s NBC Universal. The vertically integrated media conglomerate was—or was supposed to be—many amazing things, giving a handful of companies unprecedented power over the media—and the chance to earn outsized profits in the process. But its defining characteristic was its sheer size, earning it a fitting nickname. Big Media.

But the theory behind the strategy relied on more than size. Housed under one roof, a single Big Media entity would control the means of producing and distributing media content, from magazine and books to television shows and movies, from cartoons and theme parks to sports franchises and the cable networks that carry the games to recorded music labels and music publishers. In Time Warner’s prototype of the model, it would control everything from the first letter of a Time magazine story or Warner Books novel to the last alphabet of the credits at the end of a Warner Brothers flick or HBO series based on the magazine story or the book division’s fiction. For a time, Time Warner boasted a wide array of media assets.

No more. On April 29, in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Time Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes officially announced the death of Big Media. Having sliced off Warner Music Group a few years ago and Time Warner Cable this year, Bewkes notified the SEC that he intended to soon spin off AOL—its greatest expansionary effort to achieve media greatness, a move that proved lethal. And now, even the corporate namesake, the magazine company Time Inc., has a funereal atmosphere about it.

The entertainment industry is only the latest in which the idea of vertical integration failed to live up to its promise. Consider the experiences of the auto industry. Henry Ford was a huge believer in the concept. His River Rouge plant, which once built the Model A, had its own electricity plant and its own mill for turning iron ore into steel; the vast majority of the components that went into its cars were made onsite. Over time, however, this soup-to-nuts strategy came to be seen as inefficient, companies could obtain better prices and more flexibility by dealing with a competing band of outside suppliers. Over time, once vertically-integrated companies like Ford and General Motors have spun off their internal supply division to form standalone companies, in an attempt to try to create the flexible, leaner supply chains created by Honda and Toyota.

So what was Big Media’s legacy It’s bad form, of course, to speak ill of the departed, but the model has left mostly a negative mark on the media landscape and corporate America.

If you smoke, you’ d better hurry. From July 1st pubs all over England will, by law, be no-smoking areas. So will restaurants, offices and even company cars, if more than one person uses them. England’s smokers are following a well-trodden path. The other three bits of the United Kingdom have already banned smoking in almost all enclosed public spaces, and there are anti-smoking laws of varying strictness over most of Western Europe. The smoker’s journey from glamour through toleration to suspicion is finally reaching its end in pariah status.

But behind this pubhc-health success story lies a darker tale. Poorer people are much more likely to smoke than richer ones--a change from the 1950s, when professionals and laborers were equally keen. Today only 15% of men in the highest professional classes smoke, but 42% of unskilled workers do. Despite punitive taxation--20 cigarettes cost around ￡ 5.00 ( $10.00), three-quarters of which is tax--55% of single mothers on benefits smoke. The figure for homeless men is even higher; for hard-drug users it is practically 100%. The message that smoking kills has been heard, it seems, but not by all.

Having defeated the big killers of the past--want, exposure, poor sanitation-- governments all over the developed world are turning their attention to diseases that stem mostly from how individuals choose to live their lives. But the same deafness afflicts the same people when they are strongly encouraged to give up other sorts of unhealthy behavior. The lower down they are on practically any pecking order--job prestige, income, education, background-the more likely people are to be fat and unfit, and to drink too much.

That tempts governments to shout ever louder in an attempt to get the public to listen- and nowhere do they do so more aggressively than in Britain. One reason is that pecking orders matter more than in most other rich countries : income distribution is very unequal and the unemployed, disaffected, ill-educated rump is comparatively large. Another reason is the frustration of a government addicted to targets, which often aim not only to improve something but to lessen inequality in the process. A third is that the National Health Service is free to patients, and paying for those who have arguably brought their ill-health on themselves grows alarmingly costly.

Britain’s aggressiveness, however, may be pointless, even counter-productive. There is no reason to believe that those who ignore measured voices will listen to shouting. It irritates the majority who are already behaving responsibly, and it may also undermine all government pronouncements on health by convincing people that they have an ultra-cautious margin of error built in.

Such hectoring may also be missing the root cause of the problem. According to Mr. Marmot, who cites research on groups as diverse as baboons in captivity, British civil servants and Oscar nominees, the higher rates of ill health among those in more modest walks of life can be attributed to what he calls the "status syndrome". People in privileged positions think they are worth the effort of behaving healthily, and find the will-power to do so. The implication is that it is easier to improve a person’s health by weakening the connection between social position and health than by targeting behavior directly. Some public-health experts speak of social cohesion, support for families and better education for all. These are bigger undertakings than a bossy campaign; but more effective, and quieter.

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To provide product feedback