Euthanasia is clearly a deliberate and intentional aspect of a killing. Taking a human life, even with subtle rites and consent of the party involved is barbaric. No one can justly kill another human being. Just as it is wrong for a serial killer to murder, it is wrong for a physician to do so as well, no matter what the motive for doing so may be.
Many thinkers, including almost all orthodox Catholics, believe that euthanasia is immoral. They oppose killing patients in any circumstances whatever. However, they think it is all right, in some special circumstances, to allow patients to die by withholding treatment. The American Medical Association’s policy statement on mercy killing supports this traditional view. In my paper "Active and Passive Euthanasia" I argue, against the traditional view, that there is in fact no normal difference between killing and letting die--if one is permissible, then so is the other.
Professor Sullivan does not dispute my argument; instead he dismisses it as irrelevant. The traditional doctrine, he says, does not appeal to or depend on the distinction between killing and letting die. Therefore, arguments against that distinction "leave the traditional position untouched."
Is my argument really irrelevant I don’t see how it can be. As Sullivan himself points out, nearly everyone holds that it is sometimes meaningless to prolong the process of dying and that in those cases it is morally permissible to let a patient die even though a few more hours or days could be saved by procedures that would also increase the agonies of the dying. But if it is impossible to defend a general distinction between letting people die and acting to terminate their lives directly, then it would seem that active euthanasia also may be morally permissible.
But traditionalists like professor Sullivan hold that active euthanasia--the direct killing of patients--is not morally permissible; so, if my argument is sound, their view must be mistaken. I can not agree, then, that my argument "leave the traditional position untouched. "
However, I shall not press this point. Instead I shall present some further arguments against the traditional position, concentrating on those elements of the position which professor Sullivan himself thinks most important. According to him, what is important is, first, that we should never intentionally terminate the life of a patient, either by action or omission, and second, that we may cease or omit treatment of a patient, knowing that this will result in death, only if the means of treatment involved are extraordinary.
It seems that the writer is most concerned about